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General Remarks

- 4. In order to understand correctly the real regarding said importance of the Soviet Armed Forces Field Manual 1948, it should be borne in mind that World War II has caused a drastic revision of the basic tactical doctrines of the Soviet Army. The most important changes appear to be as follows:
 - (a) Defensive Battle: Prior to World War II Soviet tactical doctrine did not recognize defensive battle as an independent tactical operation. The old manuals either completely disregarded this operation, or passed over it as a very exceptional situation, limited from the tactical point of view by the elements employed: manpower, time, and terrain. The army was trained and indoctrinated for offensive tactics which were overemphasized. Offensive tactics are an old tradition in the Russian Army, at least with respect to instruction, although the study of war nistory may prove to the contrary. The traditional offensive tactics harmonized well with the aggressiveness of the Soviet Regime and the Communist ideology, not only because they corresponded to the character of the ideology, but because the very concept of defense was considered a recognition of weakness. It was considered dangerous to give the armed masses of the population an official basis for the belief that the Soviet state might be weak enough to have to fight a defensive battle. Consequently, the offensive doctrine dominated in the combat training of units as well as in the military education of individuals.
 - (1) The Soviet point of view on prisoners of war clearly illustrates this difference between the Soviet conception of warfare and that of other nations. According to Soviet Army regulations, the term "surrender" does not exist. No individual, therefore, has the right to stop fighting, and no commander is authorized to issue such an order to that effect, no matter how hopeless the combat situation is, and how senseless it is to continue the fighting. Even when his unit is surrounded and completely cut off, each individual must fight until his "last breath". A Soviet Army man can only be taken prisoner if a severe wound makes him unconscious and thus not responsible. This regulation has two results:
 - a. After World War II several hundred thousand Soviet prisoners of war were sent to forced labor camps and resettled in Siberia because they could not prove that they had been asverely wounded or unconscious at the time of their capture.
 - b. For the same reason, the USSR has never recognized the international Geneva Convention in regard to prisoners of war.
 - (2) Although the character of the Soviet Regime has not charged share world war if, the disastrous experiences of the first period of the war induced Soviet army leaders to accept the possibility of defensive battle, provide for its definition, give it a recognized place in the field manual, and regulate its application. Thus, for the first time in the history of the Soviet Army, the defensive battle has acquired its full and legal place. (Other innovations concerning the defensive battle will be mentioned in the section dealing with defensive tactical operations.)

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- New Combat Formations. Based on the experiences of World War I, the Civil War, and on the eventual development of armaments, the Soviet Army field manuals (prior to World War II) were built around the concept of mass use of infantry echeloned in depth, supported by artillery and tanks. The combat formation of an infantry division in attack or defense consisted of two or three echelons of regiments placed one behind the other. In the first months of WW II it was proved that the massed and depth formations of the Soviet Army were quite inadequate for modern warfare. As the artillery support was insufficient and the air force unable to neutralize enemy artillery and prevent aerial attacks, the units of the second and third echelons very often suffered more casualties than the first echelon and were disorganized even before they could be put into action. This experience induced the Soviet Supreme Command to reconsider the adequacy of echeloned formations and to adapt them to the requirements of a modern warfare as imposed by the enemy. Late in 1942 the Supreme Command of the Soviet Armed Forces issued Directive #00306 which abolished the archaic echeloned combat formations and prescribed completely new formations which, until that time, were quite unknown in the Soviet Army. These new formations tested during the later part of World War II proved their effectiveness, and became part of Soviet tattle tactics. They are fully recognized by now and have been taken as a basis for the "Soviet Armed Forces Field Manual 1948". As specified by this manual the new combat formations are: the wedge (uglom vpered); the inverted wedge (uglom sazad); staggered to the right (ustupom vpravo); staggered to the left (ustupom vlevo); and the line formation (v liniyu). \(\subseteq \text{See Finelestre (A)} \)
- (c) Artillery. More then ever before the PU-48 manual emphasizes the importance of artillery, which is given the most distinguished place in the armen branches. In the Russian, and eventually in the Soviet Army, artillery was always a favorite arm, but never to such an extent as now. PU-48 places artillery even above the cherished mechanized troops, and officially calls it "Queen of Battle".
- (d) Tanks and Mechanized Forces. PU-48 relegates tank units to a lesser importance than before and at the beginning of World War II. But if tank units are assigned a more modest position among the other armed forces, their importance is still stressed, and they are considered capable of independently carrying out all tactical assignments.
- (e) AA Artillery. PU-48 stresses the importance of AAA, undoubtedly as a consequence of the rapid development of the air force. This applies to PVO and tactical AAA units as well. In combat, the latter are now placed much closer to the front lines than before (the small collber AAA units, one km, and the medium caliber units, two km behind the first infantry lines).
- (f) Air Force. PU-48 classifies the air force as a supporting arm. The strategic task of long range bombing is recognized, but no emphasis, whatsoever, is placed upon it. Following the pattern of World War II, the main task of the air force is tactical support of ground forces in combat.
- (g) Airborne Troops. The airborne troops appear for the first time in the Soviet field manual. The importance and tasks of these troops are sufficiently emphasized to secure them an adequate place among other arms.

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(h) The Encircling Battle. This operation was not mentioned in Soviet field manuals before PU-48. The experience gained during Werld War II when several successful encircling battles were fought - Stalingrad was the first - resulted in an entire chapter of the new manual. The encirclement of enemy forces is considered the necessary final phase of any maker offensive which cannot be fully exploited without such an operation.

(1) Combat in Populated Areas. This too is a new feature of PU-48. Regulations for this type of operation are based on numerous experiences in Walter and Arman regulations the importance of this tactical operation, gives rules for it and points to the necessity of training personnel for close combat fighting.

Combat-Formations

- 5. The various formations used in combat are not fixed and must be applied according to the particular situation encountered. The main ones are the following: \(\sum_{\text{See}} \) = \(\sum_{\text{See}} \) = \(\sum_{\text{See}} \)
 - (a) Wedge Formation (Uglom Vpered)

For this formation one regiment is placed forward, and two in the rear, to the left and right, thus forming a triangle pointed at the enemy positions. It is used normally in an attack on a strongly fortified position. The attack starts with the frontal engagement of the leading regiment, with the purpose of attracting enemy attention to the center and thus forcing him to divert his troops from the flanks in order to reinforce the endangered center. As soon as the enemy flanks are exposed, the second line regiments attack both enemy flanks. In the final stage such an attack leads to the encirclement of enemy forces and their complete annihilation.

(b) Inverted Wedge Formation (Uglom Nazad)

This is a reversed wedge formation, with two regiments in front and one in the rear, making thus a triangle with its base toward the enemy. This formation is used normally in an attack or an enemy position when its center is strongly fortified. The two first line regiments start an attack on both enemy flanks, forcing him to divert his forces from the center in order to reinforce the endangered flanks. When he does this, the centrally located second line regiment attacks the enemy center. Such an attack leads to the breakthrough of the enemy position; his forces are cut into two separate groups with no centralized command. In the last phase the attacking forces appear in the enemy's mear and encircle the two separated enemy groups.

- (c) Staggered to the Right Formation (Ustupom Vpravo)
- (d) Staggered to the Left Formation (Vatupom Vievo)

For these formations all three regiments are deployed in such a way that every succeeding regiment is behind and to the right, or to the left, of the preceeding one. These formations are used in the attack on enemy flanks (no further information available).

(e) Line Fermation (V liniyu)

In this formation all three regiments are lined up parallel to the enemy front. There is no become echelon in this formation. It is frequently used for an attack on an unfortified enemy position, against an inferior enemy, against an enemy the is trappagated for defense, or moving into position at the time of the attack, against demoralized enemy, an enemy in retreat, and always in the pursuit of the defeated enemy.

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- It should be borne in mind, the manual states, that the above mentioned combat formations are in no case standard patterns to be used blindly regardless of the actual tactical situation. In the development of modern combat there may appear many unforeseen phases for which no rules can be given in advance. Therefore sound judgement, the correct understanding of the tactical situation, and the initiative of commanders are most important elements of victory Since troops in combat are commanded and deployed by officers, the outcome depends greatly on the ability of officers. Combat formations are considered basic concepts and must be used whenever appropriate. Since the enemy and his intentions represent an important tactical element, however, no decision on the combat formation can be made unless there is sufficient information on the enemy forces, their defense positions, strength, order of battle, and presumed intentions. This important information can be obtained only when all commanders concerned correctly understand the importance of the reconnaissance and intelligence services and use them properly. Well organized reconnaissance services are the "ears and eyes" of a commander. On the other hand, since the best decision taken by a commander is of no value unless transmitted in due time to all his subordinates down to the last soldier who is to carry it out, it is the responsibility of commanders to organize an adequate signal and liaison service and to maintain it 24 hours a day, regardless of combat conditions. It must always be remembered that "liaison is the nerve system of the army".
- 7. PU-46 also states that it is the duty of commanders to initiate, encourage and develop constructive initiative of noncommissioned officers and soldiers. Left to himself in difficult combat conditions, each individual noncommissioned officer and soldier must be able to evaluate correctly the situation and decide what is the best action for his unit as a whole. It is the sacred duty of every soldier and noncommissioned officer to strive forward, disregarding all dangers and difficulties, and to use his firearm, hand grenade and bayonet to attack the enemy in order to open the way for the advance of his unit.

Arms and Services

8. The USSR Armed Forces are composed of the following arms and services: infantry, artillery, air force, tank and mechanized units, combat engineers, articles troops, navy, and rear services.

Infantry

The infantry is the principal arm of the ground forces which is qualified to perform independently any tactical assignment. It is the only arm able to conduct close combat, and to take and hold an enemy position. Since it possesses a high degree of flexibility and maneuverability, the infantry is easily able to regroup in combat, to use various formations and to conduct all tactical assignments: attack, defense, combat in the enemy rear zone, combat to break an encirclement, combat in a forest zone, combat in the mountains, and combat in populated areas. Provided with powerful modern weapons and equipment, the infantry can engage and successfully conduct a fight against any and all enemy arms. All the other arms are supporting arms and therefore attached to the infantry. Under normal conditions the senior infantry commander is in charge of the tactical task to be performed and all other units tuch as artillery, tanks, air force, which may be needed to accomplish the task, are attached to the infantry unit and subordinate to its commander.

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Artillerv

- The artillery represents the striking power of the ground forces. Possessing an enormous fire power and the capacity to destroy, the artillery can independently perform various tactical assignments. It can destroy enemy fortifications, concrete, wooden and earth pill-boxes; it is able to oppose and destroy enemy tanks, to open passages in the enemy barbed wire system or in a mine field. Endowed with flexibility and maneuverability, the artillery can give fire support to the advancing units in all phases of an attack. It is the responsibility of artillery to neutralize by its fire the enemy gun emplacements, to destroy the enemy manpower, as well as to keep down the enemy emplacements which may reopen fire during the later stages of the advancing attack. It takes upon itself the fight against the enemy tanks and repulses the counter-attacks launched by the enemy,
- 11. With its long range fire, the artillery can take under fire the enemy rear zone and destroy ammunition dumps, warehouses, bridges, railroad facilities, command posts and other targets located deep behind the enemy positions. In combat, as a rule, the artillery units within a division are organized into divisional artillery groups" (divizionnyye artilleriyskiy gruppy - DAG); in regiments they form "regimental artillery groups" (PAG), and in battalions, "battalion artillery groups" (BAG). In larger strategic units, the artillery is organized into corps and army artillery groups. Each group is assigned a commander, who is normally the senior artillery officer within such a group, and who is referred to as group commander. Depending on the tasks assigned, the regimental and battalion artillery groups are called either "infantry support groups" (pedderzhki pekhoty - PP) or "infantry close support groups" (meposredstvennoy podderzhki pekhoty - NPP). The latter are normally organized in the zone of the main effort.
- 12. On the basis of fire power, and for the particular mission which is to be accomplished, the ground force artillery is divided into a series of ground target artillery groups and AA artillery. Groups series of ground target artillery groups and AA artillery. Groups are as follows: the battalion, regimental, divisional, corps, army, and heavy artillery groups (artillerya bol'shoy moshchnosti - BN), as well as the artillery groups at the disposal of the Supreme Command (Rezerva Glavnogo Komandovaniya). Provided with multiplicity of calibers, variety of guns and ammunition which characterise modern artillery, artillery units can participate in combat under any terrain conditions. Thanks to its valuable conscients and because it has a splendid record of achievements combat, artillery enjoys the highest respect among the other arms as all as their undivided sympathy. It is with full justification that in the Soviet Army, artillery is considered and referred to as the "Queen of Battle".

Anti-Aircraft Artillery

AAA is a special type of artillery which provides cover against stemy air attacks. According to the assigned tasks the anti-aircraft artillery is divided into: Army Antiaircraft Artillery and Territorial Air Defense According to Artillery (Zenithaya Artilleriya Territorii PVO Strany). In combat the corps and division AAA is organized into AA sub-groups: corps AA sub-groups, and divisional AA sub-groups (korpusnaya i divisionnaya senithaya artilleriyakaya rodgruppa - KZAP and DZAP). These groups are composed of organin AAA units of the respective corps and divisions, and have the tactical task of providing the artillerization defense for all corps and divisional units in any tactical situations.

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The AAA units belonging to an army are organized into army AAA subgroups (Armeyskiye Zenitnyye Artilleriyskiye Podgruppy - AZAP) and have the task of anti-aircraft protection of the army headquarters, storage areas, bridges, railroad facilities, etc located in the rear zone. Each AAA group is assigned a commander who is normally the senior officer within this group. The plan of AAA defense within a division is prepared by the commander of divisional artillery; in corps and armies these plans are prepared by the respective deputy commanders artillery for AA defense. In rombat the AAA units protecting

- (a) Small caliber AAA (Malokalibernaya Zenitnaya Artilleriya MZA) one thousand m behind the first infantry line.
- (b) Medium caliber AAA (Srednekalibernaya Zenitnaya Artilleriya SZA) two thousand m behind the first enemy line.

At a river crossing the small caliber AAA units take positions right on the river's bank and constitute the forward zone of troop air defense. These AAA units cross the river together with troops assigned to the bridgehead and give them constant protection against enemy air attacks. At the same time the medium caliber AAA units organize the second zone of tactical air defense, taking positions two to three km behind the river in order to protect the concentration of troops assigned for the river crossing. These artillery units are responsible for the air defense of crossing points and bridges until the entire operation of river crossing is completed.

Air Force

14. The Air Force is the arm which gives aerial support to the ground forces in combat. Its characteristics are high speed, excellent maneuverability, and a large radius of action. The Air Force is able to conduct serial bombardments of enemy troop concentrations, fortifications, and various communication targets in the enemy rear zone. The Air Force is also able to fight the enemy air force in the air. According to its tactical tasks the entire Air Force is broken down into the following basic groups: strategic aviation (dal'nego deystviya), tactical aviation (blizhnego deystviya), combat support aviation, and diving aviation. The Air Force is able to perform its strategic and tactical tasks either independently, or in cooperation with the ground force unit with which it cooperates and subordinate to the ground force unit with which it cooperates and subordinate to the respective ground force unit commander. The strength of the Air Force lies in its mass attack and destructive power. The largest Air Force tactical unit is an air army (Vozdushnaya Armiya).

Tanke

15. Tank units represent the shock and fire power of the ground forces. They have a high degree of maneuverability on the battlefield combined with large fire power and considerable radius of action. Tanks can carry out a variety of offensive and defensive tactical assignments in cooperation with other arms and, under favorable conditions, even independently. Destruction of enemy manpower and fortifications are the main tasks of tank units. Due to their ability to cross tranches, climb steep grades, and ford rivers, tanks can be used on any terrain and under any climatic conditions. Their main tasks are as follows:

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- (a) The most valuable use of tank units is, in the exploitation of the breakthrough, to carry the combat into the depth of the enemy's defense positions. Their task in such cases is to get into the enemy rear zone as soon as possible in order to neutralize remaining centers of resistance, destroy communications and supply facilities at the same time avoiding any serious engagement with enemy forces which may delay the advance of the tanks. Tank units cannot be assigned the task of taking over and holding enemy positions and areas.
- (b) Tank units can be used successfully only in a mass attack. Distributing tank forces and attaching them to the attacking columns is to be considered an exceptional case and should be resorted to only to repel a counterattack. Used independently, without infantry support, tanks cannot achieve a breakthrough of enemy positions. Therefore large tank units must normally be used in the direction of the main effort, and not before the enemy resistance system has been shaken. Their task is not the breakthrough, but its exploitation. A tank division is the largest tactical tank unit.

Mechanized Troops

- 16. Mechanized troops are composed of motorized infantry and all other fully mechanized arms attached in sufficient strength to the motorized infantry (the backbone of any mechanized unit). Possessing a high degree of maneuverability, the mechanized units are able to independently perform all tactical assignments. Mechanized units can cover 100-120 km in a day, which gives them a great advantage over the infantry.
- 17. In combat, mechanized units are held in the second echelon, and are not put in action before the infantry takes over the first lines of enemy positions. In general, their task is the exploitation of a successful attack. When they reach the line of enemy regimental reserves, mechanized units have completed the first phase of tactical exploitation. The following phase is penetration through the second zone of defense and destruction of enemy divisional reserve groups. The largest mechanized unit is a mechanized army.

Combat Engineers

- 18. The task of the engineer units is to assist the ground forces by clearing the way for their advance in an attack on enemy positions, for a breakthrough, for combat in the fortified zone, and the protection of ground forces in defensive operations.
- 19. Conditions of modern warfare, characterized as they are by mass use of technical equipment, provide ample opportunity for the use of engineer units in combat. These units have therefore an important position among other arms and are assigned the following tasks:
 - (a) Opening of passages through a fortified defense zone for infantry, tanks and artillery in an attack. This requires solid training and technical skill.
 - (b) Proparations for river-crossings and other operations requiring construction of technical facilities to overcome obstacles.
 - (c) Organization of defense positions, with the application of all technical means to render them impregnable.

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23. All the commanders and staff personnel, PU-48 states, must organize and coordinate their activities in such a way that they can function as a team for the achievement of the common goal, ie, victory. In this respect, constant close cooperation and maintenance of communications among the individuals concerned is the best guarantee of success. It is the task of the commanding officer to train his staff personnel and to familiarize them with their tasks in wartime. Any decision taken by the commanding officers must be communicated in proper time to the chief of staff, who must immediately inform the personnel of his staff to prepare the necessary orders and transmit them to the respective units. In detail the functions are as follows:

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- (a) Commanding officer. The commanding officer of a unit has undivided authority over his entire personnel. This authority is vested in him by military jurisdiction; consequently, every direct order of the CO is at the same time an order of the "Fatherland". The CO is also responsible for the combatreadiness of his unit, and through his staff personnel directs his unit in combat, assigning tasks and targets, directing movements and dislocation of the entire unit or parts thereof. It is the admin duty of the CO in any situation to serve as an example to his subordinates, showing endurance, combat discipline and self-sacrifice in the performance of the assigned tasks. The CO is directly responsible for the individual and collective actions of his subordinates, for maintenance of weapons and equipment, and for training of the personnel under him. In combat, keeping always in mind the task assigned to his unit and the actual tactical situation, the CO has the right, and duty, to make decisions and to carry them through. The CO is responsible for his actions solely to his immediate superior.
- (b) Chief of staff. The chief of staff (executive officer in regiments and battalions) is the first deputy of the CO, and as such, he takes upon himself the responsibility for combat in the CO's absence. Through his staff personnel, the chief of staff enforces the decisions of the CO, putting them into the form of written orders, and then transmitting them to the units and individuals concerned. It is a direct responsibility of the chief of staff to see to it that all directives and orders of the CO are strictly executed, and within the proper time. The chief of staff must be thoroughly familiar with the battle situation at all times and be able to brief his CO, as well as make suggestions for further dispositions and decisions required by the changing battle situation. The chief of staff is the only person in the unit who has the authority to issue orders and directives in the name of the CO. Such orders are signed, "By Order of the Commanding Officer, Chief of Staff" (his name and rank).
- (c) Chief of operations (Nachal'nik Operativnogo Otdela). The chief of operations is the immediate assistant to the chief of staff and his first deputy. In compliance with instructions received from the chief of staff, the chief of operations prepares all battle orders, putting the verbal decisions and directives of the CO into proper written form. It is his responsibility to see that the orders given by the CO are strictly complied with and properly carried out. The chief of operations reports directly to the chief of staff and makes suggestions pertaining to the field of operations. In peacetime the chief of operations is responsible for the combat training and sembat readiness of the unit, and in this respect exercises supervision over all subordinate units.
- (d) Reconnaissance officer (Nachal'nik Razvedyvatel'nogo Otdela).

 The RO is the assistant of the chief of staff for reconnaissance. His responsibility is to maintain constant communication with subordinate units and to be familiar at any time with the combat situation. The RO immediately reports all changes affecting the combat situation to the CO and makes suggestions to counteract enemy moves. He also maintains the operation reconnaissance map compiled from information received through reconnaissance service which he organizes. He carefully studies enemy moves, trying to anticipate and to offset enemy plans. He prepares and transmits to subordinate units daily reconnaissance bulletins which contain all new information on the enemy, as reported by the reconnaissance zervice. As a rule, in combat the RO is close to the CO and belongs to the forward echelon of the unit's headquarters.

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- (e) Communication Officer. The communication officer is the assistant of the chief of staff for communications. His responsibility is to organize and to maintain wire, radio and other means of communications with subordinate and neighboring units. He prepares a chart of the organization of the communication service within his unit, assigns code-names for units and individual officers, determines the length of waves and emergency waves, and the periods of wave shifts. He is responsible for the organization of a wire-tapping service to insure security in telephone conversations, and checks radio service. The communications officer is personally responsible for a permanent and uninterrputed communications network between the commanding officer and his subordinate units. He assists the chief of staff in the preparation of battle orders insofar as they pertain to the organization of the communication service.
- (f) Artillery commander. The artillery commander is deputy commanding officer for artillery. The artillery commander's staff serves as command organ for all artillery units. The artillery staff is composed of the chief of staff (executive officer), two operations officers, the reconnaissance officer, and a communications officer; all these persons are assistants to the chief of staff. On the basis of directives received from the artillery commander, the artillery staff prepares battle orders for the artillery units, determining their tasks, fire plans, plan of displacement of artillery positions in combat and plan of artillery support fire in various phases of battle. The artillery staff is an executive organ, and at the same time a controlling organ of the commanding officer and the artillery commander, respectively, which supervises artillery units with respect to fulfillment of assigned tasks. The place of the artillery commander is with the commanding officer in the forward echelon of the unit's headquarters. Usually one other artillery officer from the artillery staff is attached to this forward echelon.

Types of Eattle

- 24. In PU-48 the various types of battles are catalogued as follows:
 - (a) Offensive battles. Offensive battle is the normal type of combat. Success of an offensive battle depends very much on the synchronized cooperation between all participating arms and branches, on adequate leadership, thorough preparation of necessary means and equipment, solid training of personnel, and properly organized intelligence and reconnaissance services. The mission given to units participating in an offensive battle must be simple, clear and definite. A successful offensive battle must lead to the encirclement of the enemy, complete annihilation, and the gaining of the enemy's rear zone for the further exploitation of victory. A successful offensive battle presupposes superiority of Soviet forces over the enemy is one, or several, tactical clements: manpower, equipment, terrain, time or morale. Offensive battle is used to break through the enemy's defensive positions protecting their retreating forces against an inferior enemy, and always when there is an opportunity to destroy the enemy completely. Having accepted rather reluctantly the conception of defensive battle, the PU-48 emphasizes that the offensive battle is the normal type of combat. Emphasis is now placed on this point in all Soviet Army instructions, and is also stressed in maneuvers and during all high command inspections in Germany.

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- (b) Defensive battle. A defensive battle is resorted to when time is needed for regrouping Soviet forces, or to allow unhampered concentration if the enemy forces are considerably stronger; also when there is a need to complete Soviet forces with replacements, equipment, ammunition and other supplicas; or in order to attract enemy attention and strength to one asetor, when an offensive is contemplated in another. Whatever the immediate purpose of a defensive trail, take it should be borne in mind that this type of combat is always of a temporary character and cannot bring about decisive results. Every defensive battle should become an offensive battle when the moment is favorable and thus lead to the destruction of the enemy forces.
- (c) Encircling battle. The basic aim of the encircling battle, which is the normal continuation of a successful offensive battle, is to keep enemy forces tightly surrounded and to prevent all attempts at help from the outside, or breaking out from the inside. The encircling battle may be used either to surround the enemy forces in order to annihilate that or to hold the enemy in encirclement and force them to capitulate by preventing the arrival either of reinforcements and ground or aerial supplies. In the latter case, the forces not required for containing the encircled enemy are used to exploit the hattle in the enemy rear zone. A predominant role in the encirclings battle is assigned the artillery which holds the enemy under constant or periodical fire and brings destruction and disorganization into his ranks.
- (d) Combat in populated areas. Combat in populated areas may be part of an offensive or a defensive battle. It is characterized by the close proximity of the contending forces, and individual close combat fighting. One of the most important problems, and one which the success of such combat depends to a great extent, is the organization of command in the individual small units which are often left unsupported and dependent upon the initiative of their immediate commanders. Intensive training, experience, and initiative of lower commanders, including platoon and section leaders, are prerequisites, and the best guarantee for successful combat in populated areas. Leadership is more important in this type of battle because the combat is full of unexpected turns; these sudden enemy moves require immediate and energetic countermeasures, and there is no time to ask for instructions. Very often combat in a populated center takes the form of a series of fights in encirclement; in these circumstances, every building or block of houses, represents a fortress. Under such conditions the combat becomes decentralized and depends almost entirely upon the experience, bravery, endurance, and initiative of the individual. The types of pattle described above do not represent anything permanent and unchangeable. The very definitions provided by this manual should not be interpreted in a stiff and inflexible way, PU-48 states; on the contrary, the offensive battle may temporarily become a defensive one, or vice versa. Both battles may take the form of an encircling battle, or of a battle in the encirclement, etc. Under such variable conditions, therefore, every commander must use his own judgment, experience and initiative to evaluate properly all changes in the existing situation, and to take the necessary steps needed to achieve the first cost and to take the necessary steps needed to achieve the final goal, regardless of the type of combat required.

Attack and Defense

25. The rifle division is the highest tactical unit; rifle corps is the lowest strategic (operativnaya) unit.

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26. PU-48 gives the following instructions for the attack:

(a) Rifle units are assigned attack zones (polosa nastupleniya) as follows:

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- (1) Rifle corps up to 12 km.
- (2) Rifle divisions up to six km.
- (3) Rifle regiments up to three km.
- (4) Rifle battalions up to 12 km.
- (b) In a breakthrough a division is assigned a zone of two to four has.
 The first objective of the division, in this case, is the zone of enemy artillery groups; the second objective, the zone of enemy regimental reserves.
- (c) In the disposition of troops for an attack, mechanized divisions are placed as a second echelon, with the task of taking the lead from the wifle divisions as soon as the first enemy lines are broken. Mechanized divisions have to carry the battle into the depth of enemy positions.
- (d) Every unit, regardless of its size, must have a reserve in order to commercial possible enemy moves and for the reinforcement during the attack. Normally reserves do not exceed one third of the unit's strength and are of the following size:
 - (1) Rifle division reserve -- one regiment
 - (2) Rifle regiment reserve -- one battalion
 - (3) Rirle battalion reserve -- one company
 - (4) Rifle company reserve -- one platoon.
- (e) The battle disposition of a rifle division in attack is determined by the divisional commanding officer; his decision is based on the task assigned to the division and on his evaluation of all tastical elements influencing the battle situation. Deployment of a reinforced rifle division in attack on a fortified position is presented in Enclosure (B), on an overlay map of Central Europe, 1:100,000, Sheet R5, First Edition ARS 1, GSGS No 4416 (AMS M641).7
- 27. PV-48 includes the following instructions on defense:
 - (a) Rifle corps and rifle divisions are assigned defense zones (polous oboroxy) as follows: rifle corps are assigned defense areas (rayon oboroxy) up to 20-25 km, rifle divisions up to 12-15 km; rifle regiments are assigned defense sectors (we has believed) up to six km, and rifle battalions up to three km.
 - (b) Every organized defense in modern warfare must be oriented in such a way as to be prepared to withstand any and all of the following attacks:
 - (1) Attacks from any direction.
 - (2) Tank attacks.
 - (5) Aurial abbacks.
 - (4) Airborne attacks by paraghute landing forces.

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- (c) The responsibility for organization of defense rests with the respective commanding officer.
- (d) The defense position of a rifle division is composed of two defense zones (oboronitel'nykh polos):
 - (1) A first defense zone with a high density of machine gum fire, Affartillery placed on the flanks and joints, and switch aftillery positions (otsechnykh artilleriyskikh positsiy) composed of groups of divisional-towed and self-propelled artillery. In exceptional cases tanks buried in the ground can be used as artillery pieces.

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- (2) A second defense zone composed of two or three lines of infantry trenches, barbed wire entanglements, mine-fields and AT trenches.
- (3) The depth between the first and the second defense zone for a division is about 10-12 km. Two rifle regiments are normally located in the first, and one rifle regiment, representing the divisional reserve, in the second zone.
- (e) A successful defense depends considerably on fortification of positions, proper organization of a centralized command leader—ship, developed recommands ance network, and the combat readiness of all fire-arms.
- 28. The PU-48 manual gives the following details in regard to situation maps:
 - (a) Regardless of his rank and position, every commander must maintain a situation map.
 - (b) Order of battle information on such maps made in the following way.
 - (1) All enemy units are presented in blue; Soviet units, except artillery and CW units, in red; black is used for the Soviet artillery units. CW units are marked in black with a yellow frame or yellow hatches. All writings on the map are done from left to right.
 - (c) In addition to working maps, reference maps (otchetnaya karta) have to be maintained in every headquarters. On those maps all changes occurring in the battle situation are recorded.
 - (d) Maps containing information on the order of battle are classified secret; they must be registered and handled as any other sevret military document.

-end-

FUCLOSURE :


(A): Sketch Thowing FU-48 (exhat Formations With Legand

(B): Overlay Map or Control Runges, 1: 100,000,

on which is shown the deployment of a reinferror rule division in synack on a fortified position.

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Legend

1; 2,=3. Infantry regiments

4. Regimental Artillery Group, 555th Art Regiment

5. Regimental Artillery Group, 128 Art Regiment

6. 17th Mahvy Tank and Self-propelled Regiment

7. 932nd Separate AAA Battalion

8. Divisional Artillery Group, 39th Field Art Brigade

9. 64th Separate AT Battalion

10. Signal battalion

11. 498th Corps AAA Regiment

12. 57th Gds Rifle Division

13. 39th Gds Rifle Div, 28th Gds Rifle Corps and 31st Gds Rifle Div, 19th Gds Rifle Corps

14. 21st Necs Division

15. Field art maintenance shop and field automotive maintenance shop

16. Rear services

17. First objective

18. Second objective

19. Enemy art battalion, 105 mm

20. Enemy art battalion, 155 mm

Enemy tanks Enemy infantry up to regimental strength


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
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
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
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
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